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Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law 
Michael L. Perlin* 
Introduction 1 
!he question of the right to refuse antipsychotic medication remains the most 
1mp~rtant and volatile aspect of the legal regulation of mental health practice. 2 
The issues that are raised- the autonomy of institutionalized mentally disabled 
individuals to refuse the imposition of treatment that is designed (at least in 
part) to ameliorate their symptomatology, the degree to which individuals 
subJected to such drugging are in danger of developing irreversible neurological 
side effects, the evanescence of terms such as ''informed consent" or "compe-
tency," the practical and administrative considerations of implementing such a 
right in an institutional setting, and the range of the philosophical questions 
raised3 - mark the litigation that has led to the articulation of the right to ,>-
refuse treatment as "a turning point in institutional psychiatry',4 and "the most 1 
controversial issue in forensic psychiatry today". 5 Perhaps the most compelling,/ 
issues raised by the right to refuse antipsychotic medication are the potential 
infringement of individuals' constitutional rights, including the First Amend-
ment rights to privacy and mentation, the Sixth Amendment right to a fair 
trial, the Eighth Amendment right to freedom from cruel and unusual punish-
ment, and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guar.antee. Given the 
multiplicity and gravity of the issues involved in these cases, their significance 
frequently transcends the narrow focus of a "mental disability law" case. 
•Professor of Law, New York Law School, 57 Worth St, , New York, NY 10013, ms.A. 
A version of this article will appear as a chapter in The Law and Mental Disability, forthcoming from 
The Michie Co., Charlottesville, VA. 
The author wishes to thank Debbie Dorfman for her extraordinary research assistance and Susan Pere-
peluk for her excellent editing assistance. 
'The text infra accompanying notes 2-14 is generally adapted from Perlin, The Righi to Refuse Treatment 
in a Criminal Law Selling, in FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK (R. Rosner ed. 1992) 
(in press), manuscript at 1-3. 
1See generally, Brooks, The Right io Refuse Antipsychotlc Medications: Law and Policy, 39 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 339 (1987); Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugging: Atomistic and Structural Remedies, 32 CLEVELAND 
ST. L. REv. 221 (1983-4); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Righi to Refuse Tnal-
ment, 72 NORTHWESTERN u. L. REv. 461 (1977). 
lSee generally, 2 M . L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABJLJTY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (1989), Chapter 5, at 
215-438. 
•see generally, Rhoden, The Righi to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. CIV. RIOHTS-CJV. LIBERTIES 
L. REv. 363, 365 (1980). 
5See generally, Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo and Rogers: The Burger Court and Mental Health Law Reform 
Litigation, 4 J. LEO. MED. 323, 345 (1983). 
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The conceptual, social, moral, legal, and medical difficulties inherent in the 
articulation of a coherent right to refuse treatment doctrine have been made 
even more complicated by the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to 
confront most of the underlying issues in cases arising in civil settings. 6 As a 
result of the court's decision in Mills v. Rogers to "sidestep" the core constitu-
tional questions' and its concomitant articulation of the doctrine that a state is 
always free to grant more rights under its constitution than might be minimally 
mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court under the federal constitution, 8 two 
parallel sets of cases have emerged. 
In one, state courts have generally entered broad decrees in accordance with 
an "expanded due process" model, in which the right to refuse treatment has 
been read broadly and elaborately, generally interpreting procedural due pro-
cess protections liberally on behalf of the complaining patient. These cases 
have frequently mandated premedication judicial hearings, and heavily relied 
on social science data focusing on the potential impact of drug side effects, 
especially tardive dyskinesia.9 In the other, federal courts have generally en-
tered more narrow decrees in accordance with a "limited due process model." 
These provided narrower administrative review and rejected broad readings of 
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive and procedural due process protec-
tions, relying less on social science data (which was frequently ignored or 
dismissed as part of an incomprehensible system allegedly beyond the courts' 
self-professed limited competency). 10 Generally (but not always), the state cases 
involved civil patients; more frequently, the federal cases dealt with individuals 
originally institutionalized because of involvement in the criminal trial · pro-
cess.11 
As this short overview should demonstrate, it is impossible to authoritatively 
articulate on.e doctrine to cover all right to refuse treatment litigation. It is 
also impossible to state such a doctrine even for cases that arise in a "criminal 
law setting," since the simplest "unpacking" of that category reveals that there 
are at least seven major subcategories to which the right to refuse could be 
applied: to cases involving (a) defendants awaiting incompetency to stand trial 
6Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). But compare, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), and 
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 U.S. 1810 (1992), discussed in Perlin & Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the 
Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, ll BEHAv. Set. & L.-(1992) (in press), manuscript 
at 38-42. 
72 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §S.33 at 309-12; Wexler, Seclusion and Restraint: Lessons for Law, 
Psychiatry and Psychology, 5 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 285,290 (1982). 
8Mills, 4S7 U.S. at 300; see generally, Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the 
Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier? 20 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1249 (1987). 
9See e.g., Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y. 2d 485, 495 N.B.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); Riese v. St. Mary's 
Hospital & Medical Center, 198 Cal.App.3d 1388, 243 Cal.Rptr. 2431 (1987), app'I. dismissed, 774 P.2d 
698, 2S9 Cal.Rptr. 669 (1989); see generally, Perlin, Reading the Supreme Court's Tea Leaves: Predicting 
Judicial Behavior in Civil and Criminal Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 12 AM. J. FORENS. PSYCHIATRY 
39 (1991). 
10Se~ generally, United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane) cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 
1317 (1990); Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions? Stripping the Facade from 
United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 957 (1990). On the significance of courts' refusal to seriously 
consider social science data in this context. see generally, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6. 
11See generally, Perlin, supra note 9. 
DECODING RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT LAW 153 
(1ST) determinations, (b) defendants found "permanently" IST in accordance 
with the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana, 12 (c) defendants 
otherwise awaiting trial in jails, (d) defendants seeking to proffer a not guilty 
by reason of insanity (NORI) defense, (e) defendants who have been institu-
tionalized following an NORI finding, (f) convicted defendants in prison, and 
(g) capital defendants who state officials seek to medicate so as to make them 
competent to be executed. 13 However, if each of these categories is considered 
briefly, it may better illuminate whether any strands of doctrinal coherency 
can be spelled out. 14 
Doctrinal analysis has been made even more difficult by the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Riggins v. Nevada. 15 There, the Court followed the "ex-
panded due process" model in finding that defendant's due process rights to a 
fair trial (at which he had raised the insanity defense) were violated by the 
involuntary imposition of antipsychotic drugs, and requiring "an overriding 
justification and a determination of medical appropriateness" prior to such 
forcible medication. 16 The majority's decision in Riggins is by no means an 
end to the debate surrounding the rights of the mentally disabled to refuse 
antipsychotic medication. On one hand, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion 
would have banned the use of antipsychotic medication to make a defendant 
fit to stand trial "absent an extraordinary showing" on the state's part; 17 on the 
other, Justice Thomas's dissent appears to reject the notion that a defendant 
such as Riggins (who had originally asked for medical assistance as a jail 
inmate because he was "hearing voices") could ever raise a refusal of medica-
tion claim within the criminal trial context. 18 
In order to understand the scope and breadth of this right, it is necessary to 
try to "decode" it. We must try to separate its component parts, examine its 
· constitutional roots, determine the "spin" factors that will likely drive future 
decisions in areas in which there have not yet been significant litigation, 19 and 
try to determine whether "doctrinal coherence" can ever be achieved in this 
area. 
This article will proceed in the following way. In: the "State and Federal 
Systems" section, I discuss the lack of consistency within the state and federal 
judiciary system in dealing with these cases. In "Other Settings and Different 
Populations," I discuss the application of the right to refuse medication in 
other settings for different population, such as jails, community facilities, and 
state schools for retarded persons. In "Decoding the Right to Refuse Treat-
11406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
13Beyond the scope of this article are yet other categories such as convicted defendants who are placed on 
probation or parole if they agree to comply with medication orders, and defendants found guilty but 
mentally ill (GBMI). 
14C/. Perlin, The Supreme Court, Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random 
Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal Abyss"? 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
15112 U.S. 1810 (1992). 
16/d. at 1815. 
17/d. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
18/d. at 1822-26 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
19See generally, Perlin, supra note 9. 
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ment/' I consider some of the reasons why courts decide right to refuse treat-
ment cases the way they do, looking at the use of cognitive simplifying devices 
such as "heuristics," the impact of "sanism" on judicial decision-making, and 
the danger of "pretextuality" in the decision of such cases; I also stress the 
importance of ''therapeutic jurisprudence" as an interpretive tool in consider-
ing right to refuse treatment law. 20 I will also consider the potential future 
impact of the Riggins case in this area. 21 Finally, I off er some final "decoding" 
suggestions. 
State and Federal Systems22 
It is important to begin this inquiry in the context of the particular time in 
legal history that institutional right to refuse litigation began. The timing of 
the emergence of this case law and public scrutiny in the late 1970s was no 
coincidence. The strategic impetus for this litigation flowed from decisions 
earlier in the decade on behalf of institutionalized individuals that had repudi-
ated the "hands off' doctrine23 in a wide variety of cases broadening the appli-
cability of both procedural and substantive due process protections to institu-
tionalized individuals.24 While this litigation first arose in the state prison and 
jail settings, 25 lawyers representing the mentally disabled- a classically "hid-
den" and disenfranchised group26 - began to turn to the federal courts in an 
effort to seek vindication of fundamental constitutional and civil rights, 27 at 
first primarily in cases involving the right to treatment. 28 In the first rush 
of cases - arising from fact settings involving shocking disclosures of patient 
brutality, mistreatment, and abuse29 - federal judges openly embraced an activ-
U)See e.g., THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW As A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (D. Wexler & 8. Winick 
eds. 1991). 
21See Perlin, Riggins v. Nevada: Forced Medication Collides With the Right to a Fair Trial, 16 NEWSLET-
TER AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.-(Dec. 1992) (in print). 
~he text iefra accompanying notes 23-60 is largely adapted from Perlin, supra note 9. 
23See e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F. 2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 854 (1954); Siegel v. 
Ragan, 180 F. 2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950). See generally, Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of 
Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L. J. 506 (1963). 
24See generally, Perlin, supra note 8, at 1249-52; 1 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §1.03, at 5-9. 
"See generally, Alexander, The New Prison Administrators and the Court: New Directions in Prison 
Law, 56 TEx. L. REv. 963, 964--65 (1978). 
26See e.g.: City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 461-62 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part & dissenting in part) (mentally retarded individuals have been subject to "'lengthy and 
tragic' history of segregation and discrimination that can only be called grotesque''). See generally, United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). 
27M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §1.03, at 8. The seminal article explaining the court's role in such litigation 
remains Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976). 
28See generally, 2 M. L. PERLIN, supra note 3, Chapter 4. 
29See e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 755-56 
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305, 1311 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974): 
One [Alabama state hospital patient] died after a garden hose had been inserted into his 
rectum for five minutes by a working patient who was cleaning him; one died when a fellow 
patient hosed him with scalding water; another died when soapy water was forced into his 
mouth; and a fourth from a self-administration of drugs which had been inadequately secured. 
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ist model that ''transfigured institutional care of the mentally ill in the na-
tion."30 
By the time the litigation largely shifted focus from the "right to treatment" 
to the "right to refuse treatment,'' some recession from this position was notice-
able. 31 Refusal of treatment litigation challenged the autonomy and authority 
of state hospital doctors to provide what had been considered as "standard" 
treatment: the administration of psychotropic medication to institutionalized, 
mentally ill patients32 -on the surface, a seeming-far cry from the type of 
"shock the conscience" physical brutality present in the prototypic right to 
treatment case of Wyatt v. Stickney. 33 Thus, even in Rennie v. Klein, one of 
the broadest, most scholarly and most sensitive of the first generation of right 
to refuse treatment cases, Judge Stanley Brotman eloquently and candidly laid 
out the dilemma facing him: "A little knowledge can be dangerous, and this 
court is hesitant to diagnose mental illness and prescribe medication. "34 
Later, when the Third Circuit first modified Judge Brotman's decision in 
Rennie, it limited the substantive and procedural sweep of its protections, and 
recalibrated its reading of the "least restrictive alternative'' construct.3s The 
Third Circuit warned carefully about overintrustion by the courts into the daily 
operation of mental institutions: 
3
°Heller, Extension of Wyatt to Ohio Forensic Patients, in WYATT V. STICKNEY: RETROSPECT AND 
PROSPECT 161, 172 (L.R. Jones & R. Parlour eds. 1981) (RETROSPECT). 
31This recession did not affect the earliest right to refuse cases that had involved the forcible administration 
of drugs for purely punitive purposes. See e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F. 2d 1136, 1137-40 (8th Cir. 1973) 
(use of apomorphine as "aversive stimuli''}; Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F. 2d 877-78 (9th Cir. 1973) (use of 
succinylcholine as aversive conditioning). 
320n the interplay between the administration of such medication and the historic roots of deinstitutionali-
zation, see Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 29 
Hous. L. REV. 63, 102-04 (1991). 
33325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afjd sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305 (5th ar. 1974); 
see also, Drake, The Development of Wyatt in the Courtroom, in RETROSPECT, supra note 29, at 36 
(characterizing "horror" of pre-Wyatt institutions in Alabama). As the right to refuse litigation developed, 
it became clear that this dichotomy was frequently illusory. See e.g., Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1302 (hospital 
staff increased patient's medication as "reprisal" for his decision to contact an attorney). 
''Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1140. The question in Rennie, Judge Brotman found, tracked the question 
asked rhetorically by Judge Bazelon: "[H]ow real is the promise of individual autonomy for a confused 
person set adrift in a hostile world?" Id. at 1146, quoting Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionaliza-
tion, and the Adversary Process,. 75 CoLUM, L. REV. 897,907 (1975). 
3iThe Rennie trial court had extended the doctrine of the "least restrictive alternative" - regularly employed 
previously in mental health litigation to questions of custodial settings, see. e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. 
Supp. 487, SOI (D. Minn. 1974)-to medication choices. See Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1146, quoting Winick, 
Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. BAR. FOUND. REs. J. 769,813 (patient 
"may challenge the forced administration of drugs on the basis that alternative treatment methods should be 
tried before a more intrusive technique like psychotropic medication is used"). 
The Supreme Court has never squarely confronted the application of the "least restrictive alternative" 
principle to such cases. Compare Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (involuntarily committed 
mentally retarded individual has right to "reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions''}. But see, 
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (while no bright line test set out for medical appropriateness in 
context of insanity defense pleader's right to refuse during trial, due process requires a demonstration by the 
state that the treatment was medically appropriate and either (a) considering less intrusive alternatives, 
essential for the defendant's safety or the safety of others, or (b) considering less intrusive means, essential 
for an adjudication of guilt or innocence). 
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This is not to say that the least intrusive means requires hourly or 
daily judicial oversight. Obviously that would be an unworkable 
standard. Rather, what is reviewable is whether the choice of a 
course of treatment strikes a proper balance between efficacy and 
intrusiveness. 36 
The Supreme Court, however, gave little guidance. In 1982, in Mills v. 
Rogers,31 a case that arose contemporaneously with Rennie,38 it sidestepped 
the constitutional issues by remanding the case to the First Circuit for consider-
ation of the impact of an intervening Massachusetts state court decision. 39 The 
Supreme Court then remanded Rennie40 in light of its contemporaneous deci-
sion in Youngberg v. Romeo,41 that had, in establishing a minimal right to 
training for institutionalized mentally retarded individuals, announced as its 
benchmark for assessing patients' rights claims the test of "substantial profes-
sional judgment.',42 On remand (in Rennie II), a sharply divided Third Circuit 
reiterated most of its earlier holding that involuntarily committed patients do 
have a qualified right to refuse the administration of psychotropics,43 but, as 
part of its holding, relied on Youngberg in jettisoning the "least restrictive 
alternative" standard for drugging decisions. 44 
In the wake of Youngberg, Rogers, and Rennie II, the focus of litigation 
turned swiftly to state courts, and state constitutional law became an increas-
ingly more important vehicle through which right to refuse claims were as-
sessed. 45 In Rivers v. Katz,46 a paradigm state constitutional law case, the New 
York Court of Appeals concluded that state constitutions afforded involuntary 
patients a fundamental right to ref use, holding that neither mental illness nor 
institutionalization per se could stand as a justification for overriding such a 
right on either police power or parens patriae grounds.47 State cases such as 
36Rennie, 653 F. 2d at 847. See also, e.g., Rogers, 634 F. 2d at 656-57 (in accord). 
37457 U.S. 291 (1982). 
38 At the trial level, the District Court had originally entered-even a broader antidrugging injunction than 
had Judge Brotman done in Rennie. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), mod., 634 F. 
2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand, 
738 F. 2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984). 
39Mills, 457 U.S. at 306, remanding in light of In Re Richard Roe III, 383 Mass. 415,421 N.E. 2d 40, 51-
52 (1981) (holding that a noninstitutionalized incompetent patient had a right to a prior judicial hearing at 
which he could assert the desire to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment). See supra text accompanying note 
7. 
40457U.S.1119(1982). 
41457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
42/d, at 323 ("Liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial 
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person 
responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment"). The Supreme Court's recent decision in Riggins 
v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 ( 1992), may be read to be questioning the continuing vitality of this doctrine in 
right to refuse contexts. See supra note 35. 
43Rennie, 720 F. 2d at 269-70. 
44/d. at 270. 
4isee Perlin, supra note 8. 
4667 N.Y. 2d 485,495 N.E. 2d 337,504 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (1986). 
47See generally, 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, at §§5.42-5.43A. 
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Rivers48 rejected arguments that involuntarily committed patients were "pre-
sumptively incompetent" because of their institutionalization. 49 Thus, in the 
case of a competent patient, the right ''to determine what shall be done with 
[one's] body" must be honored "even though the recommended treatment may 
be beneficial or even necessary to preserve the patient's life. "50 
Cases such as Rivers and the California state decision in Riese v. St. Mary's 
Hospital and Medical Center1 thus made it appear that the federal forum was, 
simply, a venue of the past for the adjudication of right to refuse treatment 
cases. 52 Moreover, it appeared that the jurisprudential inquiries engaged in by 
the federal courts were simply irrelevant to state court judges. The Rivers 
opinion, for instance, was silent on the jurisdictional split that followed the 
Mills remand. 53 It astonishingly did not even mention the opinion in Project 
Release v. Prevost,54 where the Second Circuit (the federal circuit that includes 
New York) had upheld the constitutionality (on federal constitutional 
grounds)55 of the very regulation struck down on state constitutional grounds 
by the Rivers court. 
Rivers ringingly endorsed a preadministration judicial hearing in right to 
ref use cases where the patient was not a present danger. This stands in sharp 
contrast to the methodology implicitly endorsed by the United States Supreme 
Court that apparently seemed to accept a more informal, medically focused 
model so as to adequately satisfy the demands of the due process clause of the 
federal constitution, 56 that would employ the "substantial professional judg-
ment" test as the benchmark of institutional treatment adequacy, 57 and that 
480ther similar cases are cited in id., §5.43A, at 33-34 n. 846.2 (1992 pocket part). 
'9The court reasoned that, without more, neither the fact of mental illness or commitment "constitutes a 
sufficient basis to conclude that [such patients] lack the mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of 
their decision to refuse medication that poses a significant risk to their physical well-being." Rivers, 504 
N.Y.S. 2d at 78, 79. On the ways that courts frequently subvert this doctrine in the trials of involuntary civil 
commitment and incompetency to stand trial cases, see Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: A Case 
of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. -(1993) (in print). 
"'Id. at 78. On the empirical impact of Rivers, see e.g., Zito, Haimowitz, Wanderling & Mehta, One Year 
Under Rivers: Drug Refusal in a New York State Psychiatric Facility, 12 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 295 
(1989); Coumos, McKinnon & Adams, A Comparison of Clinical and Judicial Procedures I or Reviewing 
Requests/or Involuntary Medication in New York, 39 HosP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 851 (1988). 
. 
51209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1987), appeal dismissed, 774 P. 2d 698, 259 Cal. Rptr. 609 
(1989). 
52See Perlin, supra note 8, at 1265 (''the use of state constitutions and state statutes in state courts may be 
the last frontier for the mentally disabled"). 
53See 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §5.46, at 364-66. 
"722 F. 2d 960 {2d Cir. 1983). . 
55 Id. at 980-81. I discuss this anomaly in 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §5.43, at 347. 
!!(,See e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23 {"[T]here certainly is no reason to think judges or juries are 
better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions (about internal operations of state 
mental institutions]''); Roth, The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment: Law and Medicine at the Interface, 
35 EMORY L.J. 139, 157 (1986) {"while the 'right to refuse' is a fascinating issue for law and psychiatry, the 
problem remains clinical"). Compare Riggins, supra (discussed in this context in M. Perlin, "Law As a 
Therapeutic and Anti-Therapeutic Agent" (paper presented at University of Massachusetts' Medical Center's 
Department of Psychiatry's annual conference, May 1992, Auburn, MA), and in Perlin, supra note 21. 
51See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. 
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would not constitutionally compel adherence to the "least restrictive alterna-
tive'' in institutional drugging cases.s8 
The subsequent decision by the Fourth Circuit in Untied States v. Charters, 
severely limiting the rights of pretrial detainees to refuse medication and requir-
ing only the most minimalist compliance with the Youngberg professional 
judgment test, appeared to augur the demise of the federal court as a forum 
for right to refuse cases. s9 However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Riggins v. Nevada may have served to resuscitate federal courts as the site for 
litigation in such cases. 60 
Other Settings and Different Populations61 
Although the great bulk of right to refuse treatment litigation has involved 
institutionalized, mentally ill persons, more recent cases have also dealt with 
the application of the right in other facilities (e.g., jails, the community, state 
schools for retarded persons) and to cases involving special populations (e.g., 
persons found NORI). While these cases are still relatively numerically few,62 
they at least indicate that the scope of the problem extends beyond simple 
decision making involving civilly committed mental patients. Also, the fact 
that the Supreme Court recently addressed the question of the refusal of medi-
cation in the context of a fair trial question in Riggins v. Nevada63 should 
likely lead to greater attention paid to this area in the future. 
In Civil Settings 
In Facilities for Mentally Retarded Persons. The litigated constitutional64 
cases dealing with the rights of residents of state schools for the retarded to 
refuse the administration of antipsychotic drugs have focused on the use of 
drugs as punishment within the larger context of right to treatment/institu-
tional conditions litigation.6s Thus, in Welsch v. Likins,66 the district court 
'
8In its resurrection of the "least restrictive alternative" standard, Rivers made no mention of the Youns-
berg decision. 
59See Perlin, suprQ note 10, discussing United States v. Charters, 863 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane), 
cert. den., 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990). See infra Pan III BL 
tJJSee supra notes 15-18; M. Perlin, supra note 56; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6; Perlin, supra note 21. 
61The text infra accompany notes 62-74 is generally adapted from 2 M.L. PBRLIN, supra note 3, §§5.61-
5.62, and id. (1992 pocket part). 
62On the question of the application of the right to individuals in private hospitals, see Riese v. St. Mary's 
Hosp. & Med. Center, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1987), appeal dismissed, 259 Cal. Rptr. 
669, 774 P. 2d 698 (1988), discussed in 2 M.L. PBRLIN, supra note 3, at §5.63. 
On the question of the application of the right to voluntary patients, see Perlin, supra note 9, at SO. 
63 112 s. Ct. 1810 (1992). 
64See also, e.g., In re A.C., 144 Vt. 37, 470 A.2d 1191 (1984) (statutory case). 
65See, e.g., Plotkin & Gill, Invisible Manacles: Drugging Mentally Retarded People, 31 STAN. L. RBv. 
637, 674 (1979) (the "pervasive misuse of phenothiazines in most public institutions for mentally retarded 
persons is beyond question"). 
66373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974). See generally 2 M.L. PBRLIN, supra note 3, at §4.19. 
DECODING RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT LAW 159 
found that the "excessive use of tranquilizing medication as a means of control-
ling behavior, not mainly as part of therapy, may ... infringe on ~laintiffs' 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment. "6 And, in 
Wyatt v. Stickney,68 the district court's standards included elaborate proce-
dures governing the use of such medication. 69 
In the Community. 70 (a) Outpatient commitment. It is necessary to consider 
the interplay between the right to refuse treatment and outpatient commitment 
(OPC). 71 Under OPC statutes, individuals in need of treatment ''to prevent 
further disability or deterioration which would predictably result in dangerous-
ness,'' who are "capable of surviving safely in the community," but are unable 
to make informed decisions ''to seek voluntary treatment or comply with rec-
. ommended treatment," are subject to commitment to community-based facili-
ties. 72 Statutes typically look at medication compliance as one of the criteria 
for involving OPC, 73 and much of the relevant case law seems to explicitly 
endorse this use of OPC. 74 . 
Forced drugging in the community has thus been characterized as the "core 
of OPC."15 A powerful critique of OPC argues that its effectiveness "depends 
on being able to compel those who resist . . . psychotropic medication . . . to 
67 Welsch, 373 F. Supp. at 503 (emphasis added). The court noted that the evidence in the case before it 
reflected that such medication was used for "self-protection of residents and [because of) insufficient staff-
ing." Id. 
61Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 
373, 380 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), qfjd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 
1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Wyatt is discussed extensively in 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §§4.07-4.19. · 
69 Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 400. 
7
'7he text illfra accompanying notes 71-89 is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 9, at 50-52. 
71See generally, Hoge & Appelbaum, Legal Issues in Outpatient Psychiatry, in OUTPATIENT PSYCHIATRY: 
DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 605 (A. Lazare ed. 2d ed. 1989). 
72Seee.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §122C-263(d)(l). 
73See e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §51.20(dm) (OPC permissible if court finds dangerousness of patient "is 
likely to be controlled with appropriate medication administered on an outpatient basis"); TENN. CODE 
· ANN. §33-6-20l(b) (2) (allowing OPC where patient is subject to the "obligation to participate in any 
medically appropriate outpatient treatment, including •.• medication • • • "). 
14In re Anderson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 38, 140 Cal. Rptr. 546,550 (1977) (medication an appropriate condition 
of outpatient treatment). Compare In re Richardson, 481 A. 2d 473, 479 n. 5 ( D.C. 1984) ("Not every 
instance of the outpatient's failure to take prescribed medication or attend therapy sessions justifies the 
conclusion that he is not cooperating with the treatment program"). · 
"Stefan, Preventive Commitment: The Concepts and Its Pitfalls, ll MENT. & PHYS. Drs. L. RPTR. 288, 
294 (1987); see also, J . La Fond, "The Homeless Mentally Ill: Is Coercive Psychiatry the Answer?" (paper 
presented at annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Section on Law and Mental 
Disability, January 1990, San Francisco, CA) (in outpatient settings, "[d]rugs-with all their risks-will 
undoubtedly be the treatment of choice"); Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs: Professionalism and the Consti-
tution, 72 GEO. L.J. 1725, 1750 (1984): 
Drugs make custody possible without its traditional physical trappings. To house a drugged 
population, the thick walls, physical barriers, geographical isolation, and staff supervision of 
state mental hospitals are generally unnecessary. 
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follow a prescribed regimen of care."76 This argument must be considered in 
the context of recent literature that charges that community mental health 
services have never been truly accessible to former state hospital patients, 77 
and of recent case law that holds that Community Mental Health Centers 
(CMHCs) have the right to refuse admission to state hospital outpatients.78 If 
OPC's success depends on the dedication of CMHCs to "making [it] work," 
the concern that such facilities may pay only "lip service" to the status makes 
us reconsider OPC as a tool by which to enforce community drugging. 79 
It is also necessary to consider the interrelationship between homelessness80 
and the right to refuse treatment. 81 While common wisdom seems to suggest 
that one of the key factors in the creation of deinstitutionalization policies was 
the mass marketing of psychiatric drugs, 82 there has been virtually no explora-
tion of the impact of forced public hospital drugging on increased homeless-
ness. 
It has been argued that side effects such as akinesia and akathesia have the 
inevitable effect of retarding social skill progress and of making ex-patients 
76Schwartz & Costanzo, Compelling Treatment in the Community: Distorted Doctrines and Violated 
Values, 20 LOY, L.A. L. REV. 1329, 1384 (1987). 
In one unreported case, a state administrative agency ruled that it was improper to terminate an ex-mental 
patient from a community mental health program because she refused to take an antipsychotic drug. In this 
case, the agency director found that termination was too harsh of a penalty, since there was no testimony in 
the record as to: (1) the effects of the drug (Haldol); or (2) _the possible harm that would be caused to the 
petitioner or others as a result of her refusal. In re FHD 80-042, No. H.D.Y. 2400-80 (N.J. Dep't of Human 
Servs. Oct. 10, 1980), reported at 5 MENT. Dis. L. REP. 41 (1981). 
In addition, there had been no efforts made to resolve the matter by either prescribing a different drug or 
a lesser amount of the drug in question. Finally, the community mental health center's contract with the 
state contained "no clause or provision which require[d] clients to surrender complete control of the selection 
of the type and 'amount of the medication that will be prescribed to them in order for them to remain in the 
program." Id. 
77See E. F. TORREY, NOWHERE To Go: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 138-
60 (1988). 
78Rhode Island Dept. of Mental Health v. R.B., 549 A. 2d 1028, 1031 (R.I. 1988). 
79Hiday & Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina Experience With Outpatient Commitment: A Critical Ap-' 
praisal, 10 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 215, 230-31 (1987). See generally, Perlin, supra note 49, at 121-22. 
80See generally, 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, at §§7,23-7.27. 
81See generally, Perlin, supra note 32, at 104-06. 
82See e.g., E. F. TORREY, supra note 77, at 87-88 (use of drugs in state hospital "a miracle"). Compare id. 
at 158 (criticizing court decisions such as Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), mod. 634 F. 
2d 650 (1 Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand 738 F. 2d 1 (1984), and Rennie 
v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J, 1978), suppl. 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), mod. 653 F. 2d 836 (3 
Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded 458 U.S. 1191 (1982), on remand 720 F. 2d 266 (3 Cir. 1983), for 
permitting mentally ill individuals "once released from a hospital, to remain free and psychotic in the 
community"), to Gelman, supra note 75, at 1727 n. 23 ("Drugging of the mentally ill in the 'c;:pmmunity' is 
all but universal''). For a comprehensive analysis of all related issues involved in right to refuse ·m"edicaiion 
decision making in community settings, see Schwartz & Costanzo, supra note 80, For a fuller consideration 
of this issue, see Perlin, Book Review of A.B. JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH ABOUT DEINSTITU-
TIONALIZATION (1990)), 8 N.Y. L. SCH. J, HUM. RTS. 557 (1991); Gould, ''Madness in the Streets" Rides 
the Waves of Sanism (book review of R. J, ISAAC & v.c. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: How 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL (1990)), 9 N.Y, L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 567 
(1992). 
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even less employable once they are deinstitutionalized. 83 Notwithstanding the 
drugs' apparent effectiveness in reducing the floridity of symptomatology and 
lessening the excesses of psychic pain, 84 the linkage between these drug side 
effects, the failure of patients to be meaningfully reintegrated into society after 
their release, and homelessness has not yet been critically considered. The 
linkage may be especially pernicious in light of the parallel literature illuminat-
ing the ways in which institutional dependency progressively leads to losses of 
social and vocational competencies, precisely the sort of "competencies" that 
are essential if homeless individuals are to reintegrate themselves meaningfully 
into mainstream society. 85 
There is now some hard evidence that some deinstitutionalized homeless 
individuals remain on the streets to avoid regimens of compulsory drugging in 
hospitals. 86 Parenthetically,. other researchers have learned that the deinstituti-
onalized homeless will accept medication in social service settings. 87 It is un-
clear whether other evidence- that the deinstitutionalized homeless reject the 
alternative of mental hospitals88 but frequently seek out medical care in general 
13Compare Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1146 (likelihood of patient contracting tardlve dysJdnesia ralses 
question of whether "the cure would be worse than the illness''); Bellack & Mueser, A Comprehensive 
Treatment Program for Schi:,.ophrenia and Chronic Mental Illness, 22 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 
175, 177 (1980) (as many as 5007o of schizophrenics may not benefit from antipsychotic medication; such 
medications do not help patients "develop skills of daily living that enhance the quality of life"). 
84See Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1137: · 
Psychotropic drugs are effective in reducing thought disorders in a majority of schizophren-
ics. With first admission patients, success rates as high as 9S"lo have been obtained ..• Success 
rates are less impressive with chronic patients ••• However, no other treatment modality has 
achieved equal success in the treatment of schizophrenia .. • 
"C. KEISLER & A. SIBULKIN, MENTAL HOSPITALIZATION: MYTHS AND FACTS AB<>UT A NATIONAL 
CR1s1s 148 (1987), discussing McEwen, Continuities in the Study of Total and Non-total Institutions, 6 AM. 
REV. SOCIOL. 143 (1980), and Goldstein, The Sociology of Mental Health and Illness, 5 AM. REV. SocIOL. 
381 (1979). 
16See Fischer & Breakey, Homelessness and Mental Health: An Overview, 14 INT'L J. MENTAL HEALTH 
6, 29 (1986), finding that a proportion of the mentally ill homeless have "opted out" of the mental health 
system, preferring the "life of the streets" to the alternative of institutional life, and have elected to "live 
with" the symptoms of mental illness rather than suffer from the unwanted side effects of antipsychotic 
medication. This result may be seen, depending upon the reader's perspective, as good judgment or as 
evidence of the degree to which mental illness has impaired the individual's thought systems. See id. (of a 
series of 15 problem areas, mental illness was rated as 13th in importance by the homeless). See also, 
Gelberg, Linn & Leake, Mental Health, Alcohol and Drug Use, and Criminal History Among Homeless 
Adults, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 191, 193 (1988) (deinstitutionalized patients the least likely of the homeless 
to sleep in emergency shelters). 
87 Arce, Tadlock, Vergare & Shapiro, A Psychiatric Profile of Street People Admitted To an Emergency 
Shelter, 34 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 812 (1983) (860Jo of the homeless mentally ill were willing to 
comply with psychotropic medications in community support service settings); see generally Turner & Ten-
Hoor, The NIMH Community Support Program: Pilot Approach to a Needed Social Reform, 4 ScHIZ. 
BULL. 319 (1978). . 
81See Farr, A Mental Health Treatment Program for the Homeless Mentally Ill in the Los Angeles Skid 
Row Area, in TREATING THE HOMELESS 64, 71 (B.E. Jones ed. 1986) (the "vast majority" of population 
studied "would rather live in filth and be subjected to beatings and violence than to be institutionalized, 
even in our finest mental hospitals'') (emphasis added). 
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hospitals89 - can fully explain this paradox. It is clear, though, that further 
attention must be paid to this inquiry. 
(b) Involuntary civil commitment.90 The only important issue being consid-
ered in the involuntary civil commitment process in recent reported appellate 
decisions is whether a patient is "competent" to make the "right choice" and 
self-medicate in the community if commitment is not ordered.91 Here, courts 
regularly and routinely weigh experts' predictions of a patient's potential re-
fusal to take antipsychotic medication in a community setting as probative-
the. most probative-evidence on the question of whether involuntary civil 
commitment should be ordered. 
Most of the reported cases rely here on psychiatric "expert" predictions as 
the dispositive evidence.92 Although there is widespread belief that refusal to 
take such medication will make some patients more dangerous,93 there is abso-
lutely no evidence that psychiatrists have any special ability to predict commu-
nity medication compliance.94 There is also a body of evidence that suggests 
that this population is comprised of precisely those individuals that many 
community mental health centers do not want to treat. 95 
Nevertheless, involuntary civil commitment is regularly ordered because tes-
tifying experts find it "doubtful" that the patient would self-medicate in the 
community. 96 Thus, where the operative state statute included a presum;tion 
that the subject of the commitment petition did not require treatment, and 
where civil commitment required clear and convincing evidence of a "serious 
89See Silver, Voluntary Admission to New York City Hospitals: The Rights of the Mentally Ill Homeless, 
19 CoLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REv. 399, 400-01 n. 3, 402-03 n. 5 (1988) (substantial numbers .of homeless 
mentally ill seek treatment in emergency rooms of city general hospitals). 
i!OJ'he material i,ifra accompanying notes 91-100 is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 49, manu-
script at 83-92. · 
91See generally, cases discussed in 1 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §3.45, at 71-73, nn. 726.1-741 (1992 
pocket part); Perlin, supra note 32, at 116-17 nn. 306-08; Perlin, supra note 9, at 50-51. 
92For an example of a court rejecting this line of thinkipg, see In re J.S.C., 812 S.W. 2d 92, 95-96 (Tex. 
App. 1991) (testimony that patient will deteriorate if he fails to take medication insufficient basis upon 
which to sustain involuntary civil commitment determination). 
93Scheid-Cook, Commitment of the Mentally Ill to Outpatient Treatment, 23 COMMUN. MENT. HEALTH 
J. 173, 180 (1987). 
94-y'he literature reveals no studies on this question. A recent reconsideration of dangerousness studies lists 
over 40 factors to be considered by experts in assessing probabilities of an individual's future violence; 
community medication compliance is not included. Palermo, Liska, Palermo & Del Forno, On the Predict-
ability of Violent Behavior: Considerations and Guidelines, 36 J. FORENS. Sc1. 1435, 1440 (1991), and see 
id. at 1439 ("One should not deduce the possibility for future dangerousness from an isolated individual 
trait"). 
9
'Scheid-Cook, supra note 93, at 181-82, citing, inter alia, Stern & Minkoff, Paradoxes in Programming 
for Chronic Patients in a Community Clinic, 30 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 613 (1979); see also, 
Schwartz & Costanzo, supra note 76, at 1386-89; A. B. JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 78. 
961n Interest of L.B., 452 N.W. 2d 75, 77 (N. Dale. 1990). In the same case, an additional expert had 
testified that the patient did not suffer from a mental illness. 
A patient's refusal to accept antipsycbotic medication is also seen as a sufficient basis upon which to 
reject voluntary commitment status. See e.g., Matter of J.B., 705 P. 2d 598, 602 (Mont. 1985); Wessel v. 
Pryor, 461 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D. Ark. 1978). 
117N.D.C.C. §25-03.1.19; In re Kupperion, 331 N.W. 2d 22, 26 (N.Dak. 1985). 
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risk of hann,"98 a commitment order was affirmed where the experts testified 
that the patient would "benefit" from medication and that the "only way" 
such medication could be provided in a supervised basis was in a "structured 
residential type of placement" and that ''if she was discharged from the hospi-
tal, she would quit taking her medication. "99 
In Criminal Law Settings100 
Defendants A waiting Trial. Prior to 1987, medication cases involving defen-
dants awaiting 1ST determinations had "resulted in a series of apparently ran-
dom decisions from which almost no doctrinal threads could be extracted," 
leading to "significant and genuine confusion" in this area. 101 More recently, 
though, two separate decisions in one case-with radically different opinions -
appear to have brought some measure of coherence to this area. 102 
In 1987, a panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the first 
decision in United States v. Charters103 (Charters I) on the right of a federal 
pretrial detainee to refuse psychotropic medication. Charters I rejected the 
notion that the "exercise of professional judgment standard" articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo applied to antipsychotic medication 
cases, resurrected right-to-privacy and freedom-of-thought-process arguments 
that had been generally abandoned in the years since the Supreme Court's 
decision in Mills v. Rogers, established a right to be free from unwanted 
physical intrusion as an integral part of an individual's constitutional freedoms, 
and articulated a complex substituted judiment-best interests methodology to 
be used in right to refuse treatment cases. 1 · 
On en bane rehearing, the full Fourth Circuit vacated the panel decision 
( Charters JI), "suggesting that the panel was wrong about almost every-
thing. "105 Although it agreed that the defendant possessed a constitutionally 
retained interest in freedom from bodily restraint that was implicated by the 
forced administration of psychotropic drugs and was protected "against arbi-
trary and capricious action by government officials,"106 it found that informal 
91Defined as a "substantial deterioration in mental health which would predictably result in dangerousness 
to that person, others, or property, based upon acts, threats, or patterns in the person's treatment, current 
condition, and other relevant factors. N.D.C.C. §2S-03.1-02(10)(d). 
99Interest of R.N., 453 N.W. 2d 819, 822 (N.D. 1990). 
1i»rbe material iflfra accompanying notes 101-46 is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 1, manu-
script at 4-13. 
101Perlin, supra note 10, at 963; compare e.g., State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 389 A. 2d 1379 (1978), to 
Whitehead v. Wainwright, 447 F. Supp. 898 (M.D. Fla. 1978), vacated and remanded on other gds., 609 F. 
2d 223 (Sth Cir. 1980). 
1111But compare Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992). 
103829 F. 2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987) (Charters [), on rehearing, 863 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane) 
(Charters II), cert. den., 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990). 
104See generally, Perlin, supra note IO; 2 M.L. PERLIN, supfa note 3, at §S.64. 
10
'Perlin, supra note 10, at 965. 
106Charters, 863 F. 2d at 306. 
' ,: 
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institutional administrative procedures were adequate to protect the def en-
dant's due process interests. It applied the "substantial professional judgment" 
test of Youngberg, and limited questioning of experts to one matter: "[W]as 
this decision reached by a process so completely out of bounds as to make it 
explicable only as an arbitrary, nonprofessional one?"107 Although the court 
briefly acknowledged the possibility of side effects (a factor stressed heavily in 
Charters ]), it quickly dismissed the magnitude of their potential harm by 
noting that they were simply "one element" to be weighed in a best-interests 
decision. Here, the court conceded that it did not do an "exhaustive analysis" 
of the conflicting literature before it, demurring to that literature's importance: 
It suffices to observe that, while there is universal agreement in 
the professional discipline that side effects always exist as a risk, 
there is wide dis~reement within those disciplines as to the degree 
of their severity. 1 
The two views of the rights of pretrial detainees to refuse medication re-
flected in Charters I and Charters II could not be more diametrically opposed. 
Also, the ultimate en bane decision has led to some important strategic decision 
making. Although, as a federal detainee, Charters was forced to litigate in 
federal court, in cases where litigants do have an option of availing themselves 
of a state forum, it is now likely they will choose that jurisdictional alternative. 
Charters II thus appeared to "signal the death knell for the litigation of right 
to refuse treatment issues in the federal forum" in cases in which litigants 
retain discretion as to where to sue. 109 • 
Defendants Permanently /ST. In Jackson v. Indiana, the Supreme Court 
held that it violated due process to commit an individual for more than the 
"reasonable period of time" necessary to determine "whether there is a substan-
tial chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable fu-
ture. "110 If there were to be no such chance, a defendant originally committed 
pursuant to an IST finding would either be subjected to the civil commitment 
process or released; once having been "Jacksonized., (that is, having had their 
criminal indictments dismissed but remaining in need of hospitalization), such 
patients must be treated like other civil patients. 111 
There has been virtually no case law on the rights of Jacksonized patients to 
refuse medication; neither of the two pertinent cases substantially illuminates 
the underlying doctrinal issues. 112 Charters II should not have a significant 
1111Id. at 313. 
108Id. at 310-11. 
109perlin, supra note 10, at 994. On the pretextual nature of Charters II, see Perlin, supra note 49, 
manuscript at 72-73. 
110406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972). 
111See Perlin, supra note 9, at 48-49. 
112See e.g., DeAngelas v. Plaut, 503 F. Supp. 775 (D. Conn. 1980); Mannix v. State, 621 S.W. 2d 222 
(Ark. 1981); Perlin, supra note 9, at 62-63 n. 115; 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §5.65, at 75 (1992 pocket 
part). 
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impact on this population who should be treated like other civil patients (due 
to the dismissal of the underlying indictments that triggered their entry into 
the criminal trial process). Thus, it can be expected that future developments 
here will track similar developments involving involuntarily committed civil 
patients, and more closely adhere to the "expanded due process" model. 
Otherwise A waiting Trial in Jails. Cases involving jailed pretrial detainees 
have generally interpreted the right to refuse treatment broadly. In Bee v. 
Greaves, the Tenth Circuit ruled that "less restrictive alternatives" should be 
ruled out before psychotropic medication is involuntarily administered to a 
jailed detainee; 113 other courts have similarly ruled that the availability of a 
less intrusive alternative that could have been employed by defendants must 
be considered in the determination of such a case. 114 Bee has been read by 
commentators as being of potentially "great precedential value" because it 
refused to "completely preclude judicial intrusions into the management of 
detention facilities. "115 There has been, somewhat surprisingly, little follow-up 
litigation after Bee. 
Defendants Pleading Insanity. (a) At trial. Courts have also considered the 
impact of involuntary medication on a defendant's right to the presentation 
of an insanity defense at trial. 116 Several have ruled that a defendant has a 
fundamental right to present his demeanor to the jury in an unmedicated state 
when sanity is at issue; 117 others have found that a defendant has a right to 
inform the jury as to the effects of such medication during trial, 118 and at least 
one has found that a defendant has a right to be unmedicated at a pretrial 
psychological evaluation. 119 
Mental disability law jurisprudence seemed to take a dramatic turn recently, 
though, in Riggins v. Nevada. 120 Riggins held that the use of antipsychotic 
drugs violated defendant's right to fair trial (at which he had raised the insanity 
defense), focusing on the drugs' potential side effects, and construing the court's 
previous decision in Washington v. Harper121 -limiting the rights of convicted 
prisoners to refuse medication- to require "an overriding justification and a 
determination of medical appropriateness" prior to forcibly administering 
113Bee v. Greaves, 744 F . 2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 469 U.S. 1214 (1985). 
114Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026 (D.D.C. 1983). . 
115Note, Bee v. Greaves: Pretrial Detention and the Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs-
A Missed Opportunity to Protect Fundamental Rights, 22 AM. CRIM. L. RJ!v. 836,853,856 (1985). 
116See e.g., Note, Medical Law-Unmedicated Defendants: The Two Prong Dilemma, 1 WEST. N. ENo. 
L. REv. 995 (1985); Note, The Identification of Incompetent Defendants: Separating Those Urifit for 
Adversary Combat From Those Who are Fit, 66 KY. L.J. 666 (1987). 
117See e.g., Commonwealth v. Lauraine, 390 Mass. 28, 453 N.E. 2d 437 (1983); SUlte v. Maryott, 6 Was. 
App. 96,492 P . 2d 239 (1971). 
111See e.g., People v. Hardesty, 139 Mich. App. 124, 362 N.W. 2d 787 (1984); In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 
336 A. 2d 174 (1975). . 
119J>eople v. Matthews, 148 A.D. 2d 272, 544 N.Y.S. 2d 398 (1989), app'I dismissed, 74 N.Y. 2d 950, 550 
N.Y.S. 2d 585, 549 N.E. 2d 487 (1989). 
120112 S. Ct 1810 (1992). See generally, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6. 
121494 U.S. 210 (1990); see 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §5.64A, at 62-74 (1992 pocket part). 
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antipsychotic medications to a prisoner. 122 It focused on what might be called 
the "litigational side effects" of antipsychotic drugs, and discussed the possibil-
ity that the drug use might have "compromised" the substance of the defen-
dant's trial testimony, his interaction with counsel, and his comprehension of 
the trial. 123 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy (the author of Harper) took an 
even bolder position. He would not allow the use of antipsychotic medication 
to make a defendant competent to stand trial "absent an extraordinary show-
ing" on the state's part, and noted further that he doubted this showing could 
be made "given our present understanding of the properties of these drugs."124 
Justice Thomas dissented, suggesting (i) the administration of the drug might 
have increased the defendant's cognitive ability, 125 (ii) since Riggins had origi-
nally asked for medical assistance (while a jail inmate, he had "had trouble 
sleeping" and was "hearing voices"), it could not be said that the state ever 
"ordered" him to take mediation, 126 (iii) if Riggins had been aggrieved, his 
proper remedy was a §1983 civil rights action, 127 and (iv) under the majority's 
language, a criminal conviction might be reversed in cases involving "penicillin 
or aspirin. "128 
(b) Following an NORI verdict. While individuals who had been previously 
adjudicated NORI were members of some early class actions challenging insti-
tutional drugging practices, 129 there has been "remarkably" little litigation on 
behalf of this population. 130 The most recent important case, a Maryland state 
decision, construed Harper to guard against the arbitrary administration of 
antipsychotic drugs in the context of NORI insanity acquittees, and declared 
unconstitutional a state statute that failed to provide such a patient with the 
rights to adequate notice, to be present, to present evidence, and to cross-
examine witnesses at a drug refusal hearing, and to have the right to judicial 
review of an adverse decision at such a hearing. 131 The Maryland court's reli-
ance on both state and federal constitutions, thus suggests that lower courts 
may limit Harper to the specific population in that case (convicted prisoners), 
even where the patient's original confinement stems from the criminal trial 
process. 
Convicted Prisoners. The Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. 
Harper sharply limited the right of convicted felons to refuse treatment under 
122Riggins, I 12 S. Ct at 1815. 
123/d. at 1816. 
124/d. at 1817 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
1
'"Id. at 1822-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
Trial testimony had indicated that Riggins' daily drug regimen (800 mgs. of Mellaril) was enough to 
"tranquilize an elephant," Id at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring)1 quoting trial record. 
126/d. at 1823-24 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
127/d. at 1825-26. At his trial, Riggins had been sentenced to death. 
128/d, at 1826. 
129See e.g., Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 
(N.D. Ohio 1980). 
1l0perlin, supra note 91 at 47. 
131Williams v. Walzack, 319 Md. 485, 573 A. 2d 809 (1990), reconsid. den. (1990). 
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the federal constitution. While the court agreed that prisoners (like all other 
citizens) possessed a "significant libert! interest" in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs, 13 it found that the need to balance this 
interest with prison safety and security consideration would lead it to uphold a 
prison rule regulating drug refusals as long as it was "reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interest," even where fundamental interests were other-
wise implicated. 133 Thus, a state policy- that provided for an administrative 
hearing (before a tribunal of mental health professionals and correctional offi-
cials) at which there was neither provision for the appointment of counsel nor 
regularized external review -passed constitutional muster. 134 
In a sharply worded opinion, Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the 
refusal of medication was "a fundamental liberty interest deserving the highest 
order of protection," especially where the imposition of such medications 
might create "a substantial risk of permanent injury and premature death."135 
Harper clarifies an important strand of supreme court jurisprudence: 
''prison security concerns will, virtually without exception, trump individual 
autonomy interests."136 Pre-Harper state cases had given prisoners far broader 
rights to refuse under state constitutional provisions, 137 and the first post~ 
Harper scholarly analysis suggests that its influence on future state law devel-
opments will likely be "only hortatory"; 138 the Maryland NORI decision in 
Williams v. Walczak appears to bear this out. 
Perhaps the most interesting developments come in the way the Supreme 
Court chose to read Harper in Riggins, just 2 years later. The difference in 
outcomes may be traced to the difference in court perspectives; Riggins treated 
Harper as a prison security case while it read Riggins as a fair trial case; yet, 
· this difference in the litigants' legal status self-evidently has no effect on the 
. physiological or neurological potential impact of the drugs in question. Never-
theless, side effects language in Harper (subordinated there because of security 
reasons) is privileged in Riggins (where such issues are absent) by nature of the 
court's consideration of the question in the context of a fair trial issue. Justice 
Thomas's opinion raises grave issues for defense counsel; had his position 
prevailed, would concerned and competent defense lawyers feel as if they 
were assuming a risk in ever seeking psychiatric help for an awaiting-trial 
defendant? 139 His analogizing antipsychotic drug side effects to penicillin ·or 
aspirin may be disingenuous or it may be cynical. What is clear is that nowhere 
132Harper, 494 U.S. at 221, quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-91 (1980). 
133/d. at 223. 
134/d. at 223-24. 
135/d. at 241 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
1362 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §5.64A, at 72 (1992 pocket part). 
137See e.g., Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 526, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1986); Large v. Superior Court, 
148 Ariz. 229, 714 P. 2d 399 (1986). 
138Appelbaum, Washington v. Harper: Prisoners' Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication, 41 HOSP. & 
CoMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 731, 732 (1990). 
139Compare Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987) (no error to admit, in rebuttal of defendant's 
"extreme emotional disturbance" defense, report prepared following pretrial detainee's request to be treated 
at state hospital pending trial), discussed in 3 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §16.04A, at 425-29. 
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in the lengthy corpus of "right to refuse treatment" litigation is this position 
ever seriously raised. 140 
Competency to Be Executed. Still undecided is the important question of 
whether a state can involuntarily medicate an individual under a death sentence 
so as to make him competent to be executed. After the Supreme Court deter-
mined that an incompetent defendant cannot be executed141 (a holding that it 
did not extended to cases involving mentally retarded individuals), 142 it agreed 
to hear, in Perry v. Louisiana, a case that posed this precise question. 143 
In Perry, the Louisiana state courts had found that any due process right 
the capital defendant might have was outweighed by two compelling state 
interests: the provision of psychiatric care, and the carrying out of a valid 
death penalty. 144 After the Supreme Court originally decided to hear the case 
(to determine whether the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and 
unusual punishment prohibits states from so medicating death row inmates), 
it ultimately vacated the lower court's decision and remanded for further pro-
ceedings in light of its decision in Harper on the scope of a convicted prisoner's 
right to refuse. 145 
The Supreme Court's reasoning in this case is not clear. It may be that the 
justices felt, upon reflection, that the only issue presented was that of forcible 
medication (finding the execution consequences irrelevant), and it was thus 
necessary for the state court to consider, after Harper, whether the difference 
in long-term harm in a case such as Perry (his execution) outweighed the state's 
interest in involuntarily medicating him. 146 Interestingly, the Supreme Court 
had decided Harper a week before it chose to grant certiorari in Perry; its 
decision to vacate and remand for consideration of Harper may thus mean that 
the court could not - or would not - resolve the difficult tensions presented by 
such a case. 
Decoding the Right to Refuse Treatment 
As I have sought to demonstrate, the jurisprudence of the right to refuse 
treatment is complex. Separate bodies of doctrine have developed in parallel 
court systems and in cases involving civil and criminal litigants. The Supreme 
1
"°The only case in which a similar issue is raised is Matter of Salisbury, 138 Misc. 2d 361,524 N.Y.S. 2d 
352, 354 (Sup. Ct. 1988), holding that prior court authorization was not necessary before a state mental 
hospital could administer antibiotics to a patient, citing "overwhelming public policy considerations" that 
made it "imperative" that hospitals could perform such "routine, accepted, nonmajor medical treatment 
which poses no significant risk, discomfort, or trauma to the patient." Salisbury has never been cited in any 
subsequent case nor has it been mentioned in the law review literature. 
141Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
142See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
143110 S. Ct. 1317, 56 U.S.L.W. 3584 (1990). 
144State v. Perry, 543 So. 2d 487 (La. 1989), rehearing den., 545 So. 2d 1049 (1989). 
145Perry v. Louisiana, 111 S. Ct. 449 (1990), reh. denied, 111 S. Ct. 804 (1991). The Louisiana Supreme 
Court subsequently has ruled that drugging Perry to make him competent to be executed would violate the 
state constitution. State v. Perry, 608 So. 2d 594 (La. 1992). 
1463 M. L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §17.06B, at 208 (1992 pocket part); Supreme Court Sidesteps Issue of 
Restoring Inmates' Competency IC? Allow Execution, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Dec. 21, 1990). 
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Court's decisions in Youngberg v. Romeo and Mills v. Rogers led to an exodus 
from federal courts, but its recent opinion in Riggins v. Nevada may augur a 
return to that forum. Some courts choose to read the social science literature 
on side effects carefully while others profess that they are unable to make 
meaningful distinctions among the data. In 2 years time, the Supreme Court 
has nearly done a complete "about face" in its reading of the same evidence. 
There has been virtually no litigation in cases involving some of the most 
important "categories" of potential right to refuse litigants in "other" settings. 
The vast majority of litigation has involved antipsychotic drugs, although 
commentators and a handful of cases raise the question of the application of 
the doctrine to a full range of other treatments. 
Is it possible to extract meaningful doctrinal coherence from these conflict-
ing findings? My reading of nearly 2 decades of legal developments in this 
area suggests that sense can be made only if we first look at a question that is 
rarely asked in this context: why has the law developed as it has in this volatile 
area? 
And here I think we can make some sense, if we look at the roots of judicial 
attitudes toward decision making in such cases. To do this, I tum to a series of 
constructs that should help illuminate this answer-to heuristics, to sanism, 
and to pretextuality. After I consider their impact, I will place my findings in 
a therapeutic jurisprudence filter in an effort to "decode" right to refuse treat-
ment law. 
Jurisprudential Constructs 
Heuristics. 147 "Heuristics" is a cognitive psychology construct that refers to 
implicit thinking devices that individuals use to oversimplif Y complex, infor-
mation-processing tasks. The use of these heuristic devices often leads to dis-
torted and systematically erroneous decisions, and causes decision makers to 
"ignore or misuse items of rationally useful information. "148 The "vividness" 
heuristic thus teaches us that one single vivid, memorable case overwhelms 
mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational choi~es should be 
made. 149 It is important to understand that mental health professionals are just 
as susceptible to the use of these devices as are judges, jurors, legislators, or 
lay persons. 150 
'"The material i,ifra accompanying notes 148-Sl is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 49, manu-
script at 79-82. 
i.asee e.g., Perlin, supra note 10, at 966 n. 46, quoting, in part, Carroll & Payne, The Psychology of the 
Parole Decision Process: A Joint Application of Attribution Theory and I,iformation-Processing Psychol-
ogy, in COONITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 13, 21 (J. Carroll & J. Payne eds. 1976). 
"9Rosenhan, Psychological Realities and Judicial Policy 19 STAN, LAW, 10, 13 (1~84). 
1
'°See e.g., C. WEBSTER, R. MENZIES & M. JACKSON, CLINICAL AssBSSMENTS BEFORE TRIAL 121 
(1982); Jackson, The Clinical Assessment and Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Scientific Analysis, 
16 CRIM. JuST. & BEHAV. 114 (1989); Jackson, Psychiatric Decision-Making for the Courts: Judges, 
Psychiatrists, Lay People? 9 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY .507 (1986). On juror use of heuristic reasoning, see 
Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 u. 
CAL, DAVIS L. REV, 1013, l0S0 (1991); Koehler & Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy 
Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 1S CORNELL L. REv. 247, 264-65 (1990); 
see also, Roberts & Golding, The Social Construction of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity, lS LAW & 
HuM. BEHAV. 349, 372 (1991) (jurors' preexisting attitudes toward insanity defense strongest predictor of 
individual verdicts). On legislative use of heuristic reasoning, see Perlin, supra note 32, at 128. 
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Thus, through the "availability" heuristic, we judge the probability or fre-
quency of an event based upon the ease with which we recall it. Through the 
''typification" heuristic, we characterize a current experience via reference to 
past stereotypical behavior; through the "attribution" heuristic, we interpret a 
wide variety of additional information to reinforce preexisting stereotypes; 
through the "myth of particularistic proofs," we erroneously assume that case-
specific (anecdotal) information is qualitatively different from base-rate (statis-
tical) information. Through the "hindsight bias," we exaggerate how easily we 
could have predicted an event beforehand. Through the "outcome bias," we 
base our evaluation of a decision on our evaluation of an outcome. isi 
Sanism. 152 "Sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and char-
acter of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing 
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. is It infects 
both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices.1s4 Sanism is largely invisi-
ble and largely socially acceptable. It is based largely upon stereotype, myth, 
superstition, and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our 
use of false "ordinary common sense"1ss and heuristic reasoning in an uncon-
scious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process. 
151 See generally, Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heu-
ristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REv. 3, 13-18, 29-30 (1990), citing, inter alia JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) (JUDGMENT); s. 
BREHM & J. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A T°HEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL (1981); R. 
NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); 
REASONING, INFERENCE, AND JUDGMENT IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY (D. Turk & P. Salovey eds. 1988) (all 
discussing heuristics in general); Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplis-
tic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 S.M.U. L. REv. 329 (1992) 
(same); Doob & Roberts, Social Psychology, Social Attitudes and Attitudes Toward Sentencing, 16 CANAD. 
J. BBEHAV. Sci. 269 (1984) (vividness effect); Diamond & Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency. in 
Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 73 (1989) (same); Van Zandt, Common Sense Reasoning, Social Change, 
and the Law, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 894 (1988) (typification); Kelley, The Process of Causal Attribution, 28 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1973) (attribution); Russell, The Causal Dimension Scale: A Measure of How 
Individuals Perceive Causes, 42 J. PERSONALITY & Soc'L PSYCHOLOGY 1137 (1982) (same); Saks & Kidd, 
Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, IS LAW & Soc'y REv. 123, 151 
(1980-81) (particularistic proofs); Arkes, Principles in Judgment/Decision Making Research Pertinent to 
Legal Procedures, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 429 (1989) (hindsight and outcome biases); Fischoff, Hindsight:#-
Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, l J. Exper. Psychology: 
Hum. Percept. & Perform. 288 (1985) (both biases); Dawson Arkes, Siciliano, Blink-
horn, Lakshmanan & Petrelli, Hindsight Bias: An Impediment to Accurate Probability Estimation in Clini-
copathologic Conferences, 8 MED. DEc1s. MAKINO 259 (1988) (hindsight bias); Baron & Hershey, Outcome 
Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. PERSONAL. & Soc'L PSYCHOLOGY 569 (1988). 
"2The material infra text accompanying notes 153-66 is generally adapted from Perlin, On "Sanism, » 46 
S.M.U. L. REv. 373-77, 397-98 (1992), Perlin, supra note 49, manuscript at 78-82 and Perlin & Dorfman, 
supra note 6, manuscript at 17-21. 
153The classic study is G. ALLPORT, THE NATIJRE OF PREJUDICE (1955). 
1
"'The phrase "sanism" was, to the best of my knowledge, coined by Dr. Morton Birnbaum. See Birnbaum, 
The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on its Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN 
HEALTH CARE 97, 106-07 (F. Ayd ed. 1974); Koe v. Califano, 573 F. 2d 761, 764 n. 12 (2d Cir. 1978). I 
discuss this insight of Birnbaum's in Perlin, supra note 32, at 92-93. ' 
msee Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6, manuscript at 21-22; Perlin,supra note 49, manuscript-at 28 n. 69; 
see generally, Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 
136 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (1988) (discussing "ordinary common sense" [OCS)). 
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. !udges are not immune from sanism. "[E]mbedded in the cultural presuopo-
s1t1ons that engulf us all/'156 they express discomfort with social science1'., (or 
any other system that may appear to challenge law's hegemony over society) 
and display skepticism about new thinking; this discomfort and skepticism 
allow them to take deeper refuge in heuristic thinking that perpetuates the 
myths and stereotypes of sanism. m 
Judges reflect and project the conventional morality of the community, and 
judicial decisions in all areas of civil and criminal mental disability law con-
tinue to reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes. m Their language demon-
strates bias against mentally disabled individuals160 and contempt for the men-
tal health professions. 161 At least one court has, without citation to any 
authority, found that it is less likely that medical patients will "fabricate de-
scriptions of their complaints" than will "psychological patients."162 Another 
court has likened psychiatric predictivity of future dangerousness to predic-
tions made by an oncologist as to consequences of an untreated and metasta-
sized malignancy, 163 in spite of the overwhelming weight of clinical and behav-
ioral literature that concludes that psychiatrists are far more often incorrect in 
predicting dangerousness than they are accurate. 164 
Courts often appear impatient with mentally disabled litigants, ascribing 
their problems in the legal process to weak character or poor resolve. Thus, a 
popular sanist myth is that: "Mentally disabled individuals simply don't try 
hard enough. They give in too easily to their basest instincts, and do not 
exercise appropriate self-restraint."165 A trial judge who responded to a Na-
1
'6J>'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 329, 332 
(1991). 
157Perlin, supra note 151, at 59-61; see generally, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6. 
158Perlin, supra note 151, at 61-69. 
'"See Perlin, supra note 152, at 400-04. 
160See e.g., Corn v. Zant, 708 F. 2d 549, 569 (11th Cir. 1983), reh. den., 714 F. 2d 159 (11th Cir. 1983), 
cert.den., 467 U.S. 1220 (1984) (defendant referred to as a "lunatic"); Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F. 2d 
1516, 1522 (I Ith Cir., 1987), quoting Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F. 2d 213 (5th Cir. 1974) (using "lunatic"); 
Brown v. People, 8 Ill. 2d 540, 134 N.E. 2d 760, 762 (1956) Oudge asked defendant, "You are not crazy at 
this time, are you?"); Pyle v. Boles, 250 F. Supp. 285, 289 (N.D. W. Va. 1966) (trial judge accused habeas 
petitioner of"being crazy"); but ef, State v. Penner, 772 P. 2d 819 (Kan. 1989) (unpublished disposition), at 
•3 (witnesses admonished not to refer to defendant as "crazy" or "nuts"). 
161See e.g., Commonwealth v. Musolino, 320 Pa. Super. 425, 467 A. 2d 605 (1983) (reversible error for 
trial judge to refer to expert witnesses as "headshrinkers"); compare State v. Percy, 146 Vt. 475, 507 A. 2d 
955, 956 (1986), opp'/ qfter remand,-Vt.-, 595 A. 2d 248 (1990), cert. den., 112 S. Ct. 344 (1991) 
(conviction reversed where prosecutor, in closing argument, referred to expert testimony as "psycho-
babble"). 
162People v. LaLone, 432 Mich. 103,437 N.W. 2d 611,613 (1989), reh. den. (1989). 
163/n re Melton, 597 A. 2d 892, 898 (D.C. 1991). • 
164See e.g., J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981); Monahan, Risk 
Assessment of Violence Among the Mentally Disordered: Generating Useful Knowledge, 11 INT'L J. L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 249 (1989); Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 48 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511 (1992); Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 u. PA. L. REV. 97 (1984). 
165Perlin, supra note 152, at 396; see also, e.g., Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REv. 
197, 238 (1990) (Hinckley prosecutor suggested to jurors, "if Hinckley had emotional problems, they were 
largefy his own fault"); State v. Duckworth, 496 So. 2d 624, 635 (La. App. 1986) Ouror who felt defendant 
would be responsible for actions as long as he "wanted to do them" not excused for cause) (no error). 
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tional Center for State Courts survey indicated that, in his mind, defendants 
who were 1ST could have understood and communicated with counsel and the 
court "if they [had] only wanted."166 
Pretextua/ity. 167 The entire relationship between the legal proces and men-
tally disabled litigants is often pretextual. 168 This pretextuality is poisonous; 
it infects all players, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans 
participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase judging, and, at times, 
perjurious and/or corrupt testifying. The reality is well known to frequent 
consumers of judicial services in this area: to mental health advocates and 
other public def ender /legal aid/legal service lawyers assigned to represent pa-
tients and mentally disabled criminal defendants, to prosecutors and state 
attorneys assigned to represent hospitals, to judges who regularly hear such 
cases, to expert and lay witnesses, and, most importantly, to the mentally 
disabled person involved in the litigation in question. 
The Connection to Right to Refuse Treatment Law. The seemingly incoher-
ent splits in right to refuse decision making can thus be explained by consider-
ation of these jurisprudential constructs. Judges that employ heuristic devices, 
make sanist assumptions, and employ pretextual thinking decide cases that 
ignore social science data, privilege myths, and misstate established legal doc-
trine. Others, contrarily, read social science data carefully, avoid sanist 
thought processes and reject pretextual decision making. 
The split between the panel and the en bane Fourth Circuit in United States 
v. Charters169 or the differences between the majority and the dissent in Riggins 
v. Nevada110 perfectly mirror this dichotomy. The Charters I court carefully 
analyzed the available social science data as to the prevalence and severity of 
1
~. Gould, I. Keilitz & J. R. Martin, "Criminal Defendants with Trial Disabilities: The Theory and 
Practice of Competency Assistance" (unpublished manuscript), at 68; see also, Lamb, Deinstitutionali:r.ation 
and the Homeless Mentally Ill, 35 HHOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 899, 943 (1984) (society tends to 
"morally disapprove of [mentally disabled] persons who 'give in' to their dependency needs"). Compare 
Matter of Commitment of Tarpley, 581 N.E. 2d 1251 (Ind. 1991), reh. den. (1992) (error to hold defendant 
in contempt of court for failing to take medication as required by outpatient commitment). 
167The material i11fra accompanying note 168 is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 49, manuscript 
atl0-11. 
168By "pretextual," I mean that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and 
engage similarly in dishonest (frequently meretricious) decision making, see Perlin, Morality and Pretextual-
ity, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 
19 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991), specifically where witnesses, especially expert 
witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends," 
Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 839, 840 (1974). Compare 
Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puule: The Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the Supreme 
Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, 79 KY. L. J. 1 n. 1 (1990-91) (defining "pretexts" to include 
situations where "the government offers a justification for activity that, if the motivation of the (police] 
officer is not considered, would be a legally sufficient justification for the activity'' as well as those activities 
for which the proffered justification is "legally insufficient"). 
169829 F. 2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987) (Charters /), on rehearing, 863 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane) 
(Charters II), cert. den., 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990}; see generally, Perlin, supra note 10. 
1
'
0112 U.S. 1810 (1992). 
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side effects. 171 The Charters II court, on the other hand, rejected as incredulous 
the possibility that a court could make a meaningful distinction between com-
petency to stand trial and competency to engage in medication decision 
making: 
[Such a distinction] must certainly be of such subtlety and com-
plexity as to tax perception by the most skilled medical or psychiatric 
professionals ... To suppose that it is a distinction that can be 
fairly discerned and applied even by the most skilled judge on the 
basis of an adversarial fact-finding proceeding taxes credulity. 172 
The Charters II court was correct in its observation that "while there is' 
universal agreement in the professional discipline that side effects always exist 
as a risk, there is wide disagreement within those disciplines as to the degree of 
their severity."173 While this is certainly true, this does not excuse the court 
from refusing to critically analyze the scientific research in coming to its ulti-
mate decision. 174 
In the course of its decision, the Charters II court thus revealed its "appre-
hensiveness about dealing with underlying social, psychodynamic, and political 
issues that form the overt and hidden agendas in any right to refuse case. "175 
The court's decision also incorporated a broad array of heuristic devices in a 
way that led to the trivialization and misuse of the social science data before 
it. 176 Through the employment of these devises, it: 
... abdicated its responsibilities to read, harmonize, distinguish, 
and analyze social science data on the issues before it. It not only 
inadequately addressed the issue of side effects, but it also failed to 
adequately address issues concerning competency determinations, 
the therapeutic value of decision making, the empirical results of an 
announcement of a right to refuse treatment, and the courts' role in 
such processes. 177 · 
This trivialization of social science serves additional instrumental ends. 
It allows courts to more comfortably seek refuge in expressing common-
sense "morality," to employ heuristic devices in a wide variety of c~ses in 
171Charters, 829 F. 2d at 489 n. 2. 
172Charters, 863 F. 2d at 120. 
173/d. at 311 . 
1
"See Perlin, supra note 10, at 990-92; compare Monahan & Walker, Judicial" Use of Social Science 
Research, lS LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571, 582-83 (1991) (setting out steps to be used by couns in analyzing 
social science evidence). As Professors Monahan and Walker observed in a different context on the question 
of judicial self-professed scientific illiteracy, "Anyone who can comprehend the Federal Ton Claims Act 
can learn what standard deviation and statistical significance mean." Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: 
Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477, Sil n. 119 (1986). 
17
'Perlin, supra note 10, at 966. 
176Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6, manuscript at 46. 
177Perlin, supra note 10, at 999. 
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"uncomfortable" areas of the law, and to use sanist behavior in deciding such 
cases. 178 
The Supreme Court's turnaround between Washington v. Harper and Rig-
gins appears puzzling, and the two opinions seem virtually irreconcilable if 
they are both read as "right to refuse treatment cases.'' However, if Harper is 
seen as a prison security case, and Riggins as a fair trial case, then the rationales 
for the differences become clearer. Because the court, for a variety of norma-
tive and instrumental reasons, needed to reiterate strong prison security values, 
it decided Harper pretextually. 179 Since this issue was absent from Riggins 
(who had not yet been convicted at the time of the employment of forced 
medications), the majority did not need to resort to such pretexts in its deci-
sion. 
Even here, though, Justice Thomas's dissent reflects both sanism and 
pretextuality. His opinion raises grave questions for defense counsel: 
had his position prevailed, would defense lawyers have felt as if they were 
"assuming a risk" in ever seeking pretrial medical help for defendants awaiting 
trial? 180 His analogizing psychiatric drug side effects to penicillin or aspirin 
may be disingenuous or it may be cynical. What is clear is that nowhere in 
the len~thy corpus of right to refuse litigation is this position ever seriously 
raised.' 1 
The same methodology can perhaps be used to explain the lack of judicial 
attention that has been paid to such questions as the application of the right to 
refuse treatment to individuals found permanently incompetent to stand trial, 
awaiting trial in jai}$, or institutionalized following insanity acquittals, to other 
potentially invasive treatments beyond antipsychotic drugs (such as electro-
shock therapy or aversive conditioning, or to community or private facility 
settings. But here the blame can probably be more realistically placed on coun-
sel than on the judiciary. 
Lawyers representing mentally disabled individuals must familiarize them-
selves with information about the right to ref use treatment, both as to the law 
and as to the pharmacology. 182 The track record of lawyers representing the 
17
'The Charters II opinion 
. . . reflects inappropriate heuristic thinking in a variety of contexts. It uses such distorting 
devices as availability, typification, the myth of particularistic proofs, and the "vividness 
effect" ... The opinion's attempts to simplify one of the most complex problems facing 
decision makers, assessing mentally disabled individuals' capacity to retain some autonomous 
decision making power, further reflects the pernicious effect of the heuristic of attribution 
theory. 
Perlin, supra note 10, at 986-87 (footnotes omitted). 
179See 2 M. L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §5.64A, at 69-72 (Pocket part), discussing Justice Stevens' opinion 
critiquing the majority's read of the factual record in Harper. 
11()Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1823-24 (Thomas, J, , dissenting), discussed in Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6, 
manuscript at 40-41. 
111See Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6, manuscript at 41-42, and see id. at 42 n. 117, discussing Matter of 
Salisbury, 138 Misc. 2d 361, 524 N.Y.S, 2d 352,354 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (no right to refuse antibiotics), the only 
case in which a similar issue is raised. · 
112See generally, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6, manuscript at 60-61. 
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mentally disabled has ranged from indifferent to wretched; 183 in one famous 
survey, lawyers were so bad that a patient had a better chance of being released 
at a commitment hearing if he had appeared pro se. 184 Further, simply educat-
ing lawyers about psychiatric technique and psychological nomenclature does 
not materially improve lawyers' performance where underlying attitudes are 
not changed. 185 If counsel is to become even minimally competent in this area, 
it is critical that the underlying issues here be confronted. 186 This is underscored 
by judges' lack of basic knowledge about mental disability law; in one astonish-
ing case, a Louisiana civil commitment order was reversed where the trial court 
did not even know of the existence of a state-mandated mental health advocacy 
service. 187 
If lawyers continue to abdicate their advocacy role, it is not surprising that 
so many areas of application of the right to refuse treatment remain judicially 
unexplored. 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence188 
"Therapeutic jurisprudence" studies the role of the law as a therapeutic 
agent. 189 This perspective recognizes that substantive rules, legal procedures, 
183See Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 
16 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 39, 43-45 (1992); see also, e.g., Schwartz, Damage Actions as a Strategy for 
Enhancing the Quality of Care of Persons With Mental Disabilities, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 
651, 662 (1989-90) (describing "wholesale lack of legal advocacy" available to patients in public mental 
institutions). 
184 Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, 
and a Proposal, 4S MISS. L.J. 43, 72 (1974). One half of the lawyers assigned to represent individuals in 
civil commitment cases in Dallas were unaware of the existence of either of the two treatises written 
specifically about Texas's mental health law. Shuman & Hawkins, The Use of Alternatives to Institutional-
ir.ation of the Mentally Ill, 33 Sw. L.J. ll81, 1193-94 (1980) (attorneys received $25 per case); accord, 
Perlin, supra note 183, at son. 66 (Virginia attorneys received $25 per case as of 1984). 
mPoythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope With Expert Testi-
mony, 2 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1, IS (1978). There is similar evide_nce in other areas of the law that 
knowledge alone is an insufficient impetus for attitudinal change. See e.g., Bohm, Clark & Aveni, Knowl-
edge and Death Penalty Opinion: A Test of the Marshall Hypothesis, 28 J · REs. CRIME & DELIN7DQ. 360 
(1991). 
'~or a rare judicial acknowledgement of the impact of lawyer incompetency in another area where 
inadequate counsel leads to morally intolerable results, see Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P. 2d 70, 104 (Wyo. 
1991) (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting in part & concurring in part) ("We .•. let 'chiropractors' with law degrees 
perform the equivalent of brain surgery in capital cases, and, predictably, the 'patient' often dies. This is 
intolerable.''). 
187/n re C.P.K., 516 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (La. App. 19878). 
188The material ifllra accompanyi~g notes 189-92 is generally adapted from Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 
6, manuscript at S6-S1. 
189See THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT, supra note 20; ESSAYS IN 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (D. Wexler & B. Winick eds. 1991); Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisp"'dence and 
Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, ll BEHAV. Sci. & L.-(1992) (in print); Wexler, Putting 
Mental Health in Mental Health Law, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992) (Wexler, Putting Mental Health); 
Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Jurisp"'dence and Criminal Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 MENT. & PHYS. 
Dis. L. RPTR. 225 (1992); Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Jurisp"'dence as a New Approach to Mental 
Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 4S U. MIAMI L. REv. 979 (1991) (Wexler & Winick, New 
Approach). 
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and lawyers' roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences, 
and questions whether such rules, procedures, and roles can or should be 
reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating 
due process principles. 190 
While an impressive body of literature has been produced, 191 there has not 
yet been a systematic investigation into the reasons why some courts decide 
cases "therapeutically" and others "antitherapeutically." My preliminary con-
clusion is that sanism is such a dominant psychological force that it (a) distorts 
"rational" decision making, (b) encourages (albeit on at least a partially uncon-
scious level) pretextuality, and (c) prevents decision makers from intelligently 
and coherently focusing on questions that are meaningful to therapeutic juris-
prudential inquiries. 192 
In Right to Refuse Treatment Cases. 193 It should be intuitively self-evident 
that the area of the right to refuse treatment is as fertile a field as one can 
imagine for the application of these insights. There is truly a broad array 
of topics for scholars to examine: the "real world" implications of decisions 
expanding (or contracting) the substantive right to refuse, and the scope of 
procedural due process protections available to right to refuse invokers;194 the 
impact of what Stanley Brodsky has called "litigaphobia"195 (and what may 
simply be a rarified form of passive-aggressive behavior)196 in mental health 
professionals' responses to court orders mandating the right to refuse; 197 the 
postinstitutional impact of refusal; 198 the implications of what Thomas Gutheil 
and his colleagues have called "critogenesis" (meaning the "inherent risks of 
legal intervention in medical decisionmaking"199 in right to refuse litigation); 
•~exler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity Acquittee Conditional Release Process, 27 
CRIM. L. BULL. 18, 19 n. S (1991); see generally, Wexler, Putting Mental Health, supra note 189. 
191See Wexler & Winick, New Approach, supra note 189, at 981 n. 9. 
192See M. Perlin, supra note 56 (suggesting that influence of sanism must be considered in therapeutic 
jurisprudence investigations). 
193Much of the text if!/ra accompanying notes 194-202 is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 9, at 
54-SS. 
194See 2 M. L. PERLIN, supra note 3, at §§5.47-5 .51; Perlin, supra note 49, at 104 n. 245. 
195See Brodsky, Fear of Litigation in Mental Health Professionals, IS CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 492, 497 
(1988). 
196Zito, Haimotitz, Wanderling & Mehta, supra note SO. 
1971 discuss Brodsky's and Zita's insights in this context in Perlin, supra note JO, at 989 n. 211, and id. at 
984-85. 
198Compare Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299-1300 (D.N.J. 1979) (antipsychotic drugs also serve 
to "inhibit a patient's ability to learn social skills needed to fully recover from psychosis"), to In re Melton, 
565 A. 2d 635, 649 (D.C. 1989) (Schwelb, J ., dissenting), vacated and rehearing granted, 581 A. 2d 788 
(1990), superceded on rehearing, 597 A. 2d 892 (D.C. 1991): 
I am constrained to wonder how many of the homeless persons who live wretched and 
squalid lives •• . are there because they have ''won," through litigation or the threat thereof, 
. •• the "liberty" not to be required to take medication essential to their mental health. 
199See Gutheil, Burstzajn, Kaplan & Brodsky, Participation in Competency Assessment and Treatment 
Decisions: The Role of the Psychiatrist-Attorney Team, II MENT, & PHYS. Dis. L. RPTR. 446,449 (1987). 
I discuss this criticism in Perlin, supra note 32, at 88-89 n. 15 I . 
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the extent to which courts are even willing to consider the underlying social 
science data. 200 · 
We have not even skimmed the surface of this important investigation; if 
scholars and researchers turn their attention to it seriously, it adds one more 
important set of factors "into the mix" that must be considered in making 
predictions about future judicial behavior. 201 
Conclusion 
In order to understand right to refuse treatment law, we must decode it. It 
is not enough to simply discuss the right as a ''turf battle" between patients' 
rights lawyers and clinicians or as a trompe d'oei/ effect (that reflects either a 
series of fixed constitutional principles or of treatment decisions). As I have 
sought to demonstrate in this article, the right remains the most volatile area 
of mental disability law but it is one that can be contextualized if the jurispru-
dential and cognitive constructs just discussed are always kept in mind. 
The general conservative trend of the federal courts has created a "shadow 
land" of right to refuse litigation in state courts, a universe that will most 
likely continue to grow both quantitatively and qualitatively, but that will be 
recalibrated as a result of the Supreme Court's recent Riggins decision. The 
split in the courts reflects radically different visions of the role of the judiciary 
in overseeing institutional conditions and care. While there is a substantial 
body of right to refuse law dealing with certain discrete populations, many 
other important subclasses have been the subject of negligible litigation; 
whether or not these become "growth areas" in the near and distant future 
depends largely on the extent to which counsel begins to serve a true representa-
tional role in this area. It is necessary that the precise status of the patient-
e.g., jail detainee; prisoner; insanity acquittee; Jacksonized permanently in-
competent- be "unpacked" so as to "decode" the operative, controlling legal 
principles. Finally, it is not enough to simply look at the issue as if it reflects 
only questions of "patients' rights" or ''treaters' autonomy." It is also necessary 
to weigh and consider cognitive psychology insights, constructs such as "san-
ism" and "pretextuality," and therapeutic jurisprudence principles into our 
data base to help understand why courts do what they do and what the ultimate 
impact of their actions will be. 
If all of this is done, it is possible that some harmony might be brought to 
this area of litigation, and that the dilemma at the heart of the controversy-
"preserving patient dignity while maintaining allegiance to treatment 
needs"202 - might yet be resolved. 
zaiSee generally, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6. 
2011 consider Riggins in this context in M. Perlin, supra note 56, and Perlin, supra note 21. 
202Roth, supra note 56, at 161. 
